Medical savings accounts:cost control, efficiency, and equity perspectives by Wounters, Olivier J et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1017/S1744133116000025
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Wounters, O. J., Cylus, J., Yang, W., Thomson, S., & McKee, M. (2016). Medical savings accounts: cost control,
efficiency, and equity perspectives. Health economics policy and law, 11(3). 10.1017/S1744133116000025
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
 1 
 
Medical savings accounts: Assessing their impact on efficiency, equity, and financial 
protection in health care 
 
Olivier J. Wouters,1 Jonathan Cylus,1,2 Wei Yang,1,3 Sarah Thomson,1,2,4 Martin McKee2,5 
 
1 LSE Health, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK 
2 European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, London, UK 
3 Centre for Health Services Studies, University of Kent, Kent, UK 
4 WHO Barcelona Office for Health Systems Strengthening, Barcelona, Spain 
5 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Medical savings accounts (MSAs) allow enrolees to withdraw money from earmarked funds 
to pay for health care. The accounts are usually accompanied by out-of-pocket payments and 
a high-deductible insurance plan. This article reviews the association of MSAs with 
efficiency, equity, and financial protection. We draw on evidence from four countries where 
MSAs play a significant role in the financing of health care: China, Singapore, South Africa, 
and the United States of America. The available evidence suggests that MSA schemes have 
generally been inefficient and inequitable and have not provided adequate financial 
protection. The impact of these schemes on long-term health-care costs is unclear. 
Policymakers and others proposing the expansion of MSAs should make explicit what they 
seek to achieve given the shortcomings of the accounts.  
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Introduction 
A number of countries are considering whether medical savings accounts (MSAs) are a 
viable way of financing health care. This is in large part due to Singapore’s apparent success 
in using these accounts in combination with other financing mechanisms to provide high-
quality care at comparatively low cost. In recent years, MSAs have been discussed by policy 
makers and interest groups in Canada and some European countries, although they have not 
been introduced in any of these nations (Hurley et al. 2008; Thomson et al. 2010).  
One reason for this interest is that MSAs have been promoted by prominent think tanks. 
For example, the Adam Smith Institute in the United Kingdom (UK) has called for a rapid 
move away from the National Health Service — a universal, tax-funded health system — to a 
system funded through individual MSAs (Worstall 2013; Goldsworthy 2014). Although the 
argument was based on questionable cross-country comparisons and was light on detail of 
how such a scheme would work, the recommendation should not be ignored as the Institute is 
influential with the government that came to power in the 2015 general election in the UK. In 
the United States of America (USA), a widely-circulated book published by the Brookings 
Institution lauded the Singaporean health system for providing “affordable excellence” 
(Haseltine 2013), although this interpretation was subsequently challenged (McKee and 
Busse 2013). There are current Republican proposals to repeal the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, colloquially known as Obamacare, and to expand the use of MSAs in 
the USA (Lueck 2015; Park and Biniek 2015). 
MSAs allow individuals and/or households to withdraw money from earmarked funds to 
pay for eligible health-care costs; employers often also contribute to these personalised 
accounts. Enrolees therefore pool risks over time, although they do not pool risks across the 
wider population. The accounts are usually accompanied by out-of-pocket payments and a 
high-deductible insurance plan that covers catastrophic costs. In the USA, this combination is 
often called 'consumer-directed health care' (Buchmueller 2008). MSA plans can differ in 
terms of cost sharing (i.e. user charges), contribution, and spending rules. 
The key aims of MSAs include: (1) encouraging personal responsibility for health and 
health care; (2) increasing provider choice for patients; (3) enhancing financial protection; (4) 
improving efficiency; and (5) controlling health-care costs. The extent to which they achieve 
these goals is widely debated (Gramm 1994; Massaro and Wong 1995; Pauly and Goodman 
1995; Thorpe 1995; Hsiao 1995; Dixon 2002; Davis 2004; Lee and Zapert 2005; McConnell 
2005; Robinson 2005; Bloche 2006, 2007; Buntin et al. 2006; Remler and Glied 2006; 
Baicker, Dow and Wolfson 2007; Woolhandler and Himmelstein 2007; Haseltine 2013; 
McKee and Busse 2013; Park 2015). 
This article provides a critical assessment of MSAs as a financing option for health care. 
We briefly outline the key features of existing MSA schemes, and review the evidence on the 
association of MSAs with efficiency, equity, and financial protection. 
MSA designs 
MSAs currently only play a significant role in the financing of health care in China, 
Singapore, South Africa, and the USA (Table 1). In Singapore, Medisave is a compulsory 
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MSA scheme launched in 1984 to limit government exposure to health-care costs. It is 
complemented by two other components: MediShield, a voluntary high-deductible, 
catastrophic insurance plan, and the Medical Endowment Fund (Medifund), a safety net for 
poorer people. Medisave and Medishield are part of the Central Provident Fund, a 
government-managed savings scheme (Barr 2001; Hsiao 2001; Asher and Nandy 2006; 
Asher, Ramesh, and Maresso 2008). In recent years, other components aimed at high-income 
individuals, older people, and long-term care recipients have been introduced. 
China introduced compulsory MSAs for all urban employees in 1998 to try to increase the 
proportion of insured individuals, protect patients from impoverishment due to medical 
expenses, and enhance price competition in primary care to contain costs. The accounts are 
accompanied by a social risk-pooling fund that covers catastrophic medical expenses. In 
2003, the government also introduced a government-managed, voluntary financing scheme 
for the rural Chinese population, and many counties now use a combination of MSAs and 
high-deductible catastrophic insurance to cover this population (Yip and Hsiao 1997; Lei and 
Lin 2009; Yip and Hsiao 2009). The administration of the rural scheme has been devolved to 
local governments. 
In South Africa, voluntary MSAs were introduced in 1994 to limit financial risk for 
private insurers. Initially, insurers were allowed to design their own MSA plans. During the 
2000s, regulation of MSAs was phased in to deter aggressive selection of healthy individuals, 
to minimise the exploitation of tax loopholes, and to reduce the threat to social solidarity 
(McLeod and McIntyre 2008). 
MSAs were introduced in the USA in 2003 and are generally known as health savings 
accounts (HSAs). HSAs are voluntary, employer-sponsored schemes that are often managed 
by private insurers or other financial institutions; they are also available for individual 
purchase. The aim of HSAs is to increase insurance coverage rates and to curb health 
expenditure growth. Between 2006 and 2010, the number of registered HSAs grew from 1.3 
million to 8.4 million, corresponding to an increase from USD 873.4 million to USD 12.4 
billion in HSA assets (Fronstin 2012). Individuals still have to pay for some health-care costs 
out-of-pocket, and there is no government-underwritten catastrophic coverage (Glied 2008). 
Health reimbursement accounts (HRAs) — another common type of consumer-directed 
health plan — were available prior to 2003. HRAs operate similarly to HSAs, but the former 
are not portable between employers and only employers can contribute to them. There is also 
no limit on how much employers can contribute each year to HRAs, and it is not required that 
the accounts be coupled with high-deductible insurance plans (Buchmueller 2008). 
 
Table 1. Key features of MSA schemes 
 Singapore China South Africa USA* 
Programme 
National government 
scheme (MediSave) 
accompanied by a 
voluntary, high-
deductible insurance 
plan to cover 
catastrophic 
expenditure 
National government 
policy for urban 
employee insurance 
participants with 
regional variation in 
design. Other 
schemes (e.g., for 
rural populations) 
Operates in private 
insurance market; 
minimal national 
regulation 
Operates in private 
insurance market 
within a national 
regulatory framework; 
scheme design varies 
across insurance plans 
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(MediShield), as well 
as a safety net for 
low-income patients 
(Medifund) 
also include MSAs 
Contributions 
Compulsory; 
employees and 
employers pay a % of 
employee wages 
(varies by age); 
government tops up 
accounts on an ad hoc 
basis; annual 
contribution cap 
Compulsory for 
urban employees, 
with employees and 
employers paying a 
% of employee 
wages; the 
government also 
contributes in some 
regions; the 
contributions vary 
across regions for 
other schemes (e.g., 
for rural population) 
Voluntary; annual 
contribution cap; 
employees and 
employers 
contribute 
Voluntary; annual 
contribution cap; 
employees and 
employers contribute 
Incentives to 
save 
Contributions are tax-
exempt, accumulate 
interest, and can be 
bequeathed 
Saving is 
compulsory; 
contributions, 
interest, and 
withdrawals are not 
taxed 
Contributions, 
interest, and 
withdrawals are not 
taxed 
Contributions, 
interest, and 
withdrawals are not 
taxed; health savings 
accounts are portable 
across jobs 
Restrictions on 
use of savings 
List of eligible health 
services (e.g. 
inpatient care in 
approved hospitals); 
withdrawals subject 
to a daily and annual 
cap; substantial user 
charges to promote 
individual 
responsibility 
Depending on the 
design of the scheme, 
the funds can be used 
to cover inpatient 
care, outpatient care, 
or both; some 
schemes also allow 
patients to use funds 
to pay for preventive 
care, as well as 
deductibles for social 
health insurance 
Contributions 
capped; usually 
limited to covering 
outpatient care or 
user charges for 
care covered by 
private insurance; 
benefit structures 
are poorly defined 
and deductibles 
vary depending on 
the procedure 
Contributions capped; 
most insurers provide 
a list of preferred 
providers that are 
accompanied by lower 
user charges; to 
support the use of 
preventive care, most 
plans exclude selected 
services (e.g. 
immunisations and 
diagnostic 
colonoscopies) from 
the deductibles 
* This information relates to health savings accounts (HSAs) 
Source: Adapted from Cylus and Thomson (2012). 
 
How well do MSAs meet their stated goals? 
This section reviews evidence on the effects of MSAs on efficiency, equity, and financial 
protection. These dimensions have been the focus of the empirical studies of MSAs to date. 
Two authors (O.J.W. and W.Y.) independently searched Cochrane, EconLit, MEDLINE, 
Scopus, and ISI Web of Science databases for peer-reviewed, empirical studies written in 
Chinese or English that looked at the association between MSAs and one or more of these 
three outcomes (i.e. efficiency, equity, and financial protection). 
We searched titles and abstracts using the terms “consumer-directed health care”, “health 
savings account”, “medical savings account”, and the plural forms of these terms; we 
considered all literature published up until September 24, 2015, when the search was 
conducted. After removing duplicates and articles with no abstracts, both authors separately 
screened the abstracts/titles and reviewed the full texts of potentially relevant articles. 
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Disagreements over article inclusions were resolved through discussions between the two 
authors. 
We also hand searched the reference lists of selected articles and one author (W.Y.) 
searched the China National Knowledge Infrastructure database using the term “medical 
savings account” (in Chinese). We identified other relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature 
from Google searches. Most of the available empirical evidence comes from the USA; we 
included studies of both HSAs and HRAs. 
 
Efficiency 
 
It is suggested that MSAs, like user charges, can enhance efficiency and, potentially, 
control health-care costs by reducing the use of low-value treatments. Analyses of selected 
employer-sponsored plans in the USA, however, have suggested that HSAs discourage the 
use of both low- and high-value treatments (Buntin et al. 2011; Dixon, Greene, and Hibbard 
2008; Parente, Feldman, and Chen 2008; Hardie et al. 2010; Charlton et al. 2011). One study 
(Greene et al. 2008) observed that enrolment in consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs) did 
not greatly influence the use of generic medicines. Instead, enrolees in high-deductible 
CDHPs were two to three times more likely to discontinue pharmacologic treatment in two of 
five drug classes — anti-hypertensive and lipid-lowering medicines — than were enrolees 
with other types of coverage (Greene et al. 2008). Another study showed that enrollment in 
CDHPs with HSAs was associated with reduced adherence to medicines among patients with 
four out of five selected chronic conditions (Fronstin, Sepúlveda, and Roebuck 2013a). 
Researchers have generally concluded that individuals who switch from traditional 
insurance plans to CDHPs tend to spend less on health care during the first one to three years 
after the switch compared to those who stay in traditional plans (Parente, Feldman, and 
Christianson 2004a; Lo Sasso, Shah, and Frogner 2010; Buntin et al. 2011; Charlton et al. 
2011). This effect appears to be more pronounced for those who enrol in CDHPs with higher 
deductibles (Haviland et al. 2011). For example, an analysis of spending patterns over three 
years among 76,310 employees at small and midsized firms — 22,587 of whom enrolled in 
HSAs during that time — found that HSA enrolees spent, on average, between 5% and 7% 
less per year in total than non-HSA enrolees, controlling for confounders; much of the 
observed reduction in overall spending occurred during the first year of enrolment (Lo Sasso, 
Shah, and Frogner 2010). Another study showed that, on average, CDHP enrolees spent less 
overall over three years of follow-up than did enrolees in a preferred provider organisation 
(PPO), controlling for enrolee characteristics; CDHP enrolees, however, spent more than 
enrolees in a health maintenance organisation (HMO). The authors noted that these results 
were “not consistent across different types of medical expenditures, and there [were] 
differences by employer versus employee payment” (Parente, Feldman, and Christianson 
2004a). 
Yet, if MSAs deter the use of effective, high-value treatment where the benefits might not 
be immediate or obvious to patients (e.g. preventive care like cancer screening), this could 
raise health expenditure over time. One study observed that enrollees in a CDHP had both 
fewer prescriptions filled (0.26 per enrollee per year) and fewer office visits to physicians 
(0.85 per enrollee per year) after four years than did enrollees in a PPO, but the former group 
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also had slightly more emergency department visits after four years (0.018 per enrollee per 
year) (Fronstin, Sepúlveda, and Roebuck 2013b). Another study similarly found that enrolees 
in a CDHP had, on average, fewer physician visits and fewer prescriptions filled than did 
enrolees in a PPO or a HMO during the study period; CDHP enrolees also routinely paid less 
out-of-pocket than did enrolees in the PPO (Parente, Feldman, and Christianson 2004a). 
Meanwhile, the CDHP cohort had a larger growth in hospital costs and admission rates 
between 2000 and 2002 than did enrolees in either the PPO or the HMO, with a sharp rise in 
hospital expenditure in the third year of follow-up among CDHP enrolees. The authors 
suggested that enrolment in a CDHP might have made the patients more price conscious and 
led them to forego care until they fell ill and needed to be hospitalised. However, the authors 
acknowledged it was not possible to attribute causality based on the study data (Parente, 
Feldman, and Christianson 2004a). 
Such findings are in line with evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, 
which suggested that most patients are unable to distinguish consistently between high- and 
low-value treatments (Newhouse 1993). Not all US studies, however, have found that 
enrolment in CDHPs reduces the use of preventive care, probably because such care is often 
exempt from out-of-pocket payments (Rowe et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 2008; Cress and 
Zimmer 2011). Others have also found that educating HSA enrolees about the possible 
savings from choosing cheaper generic drugs instead of more expensive brand-name drugs is 
associated with greater use of the former (Sedjo and Cox 2009). Beyond such measures, 
however, it is unclear whether MSA plans can be designed in ways that consistently 
discourage the use of low-value care and not high-value care. 
Another issue is that once individuals with an accompanying insurance plan have met the 
deductible, additional health care is usually covered at no extra charge by the insurer. Thus, 
even if MSAs discourage the use of low-cost, low-value health care, they are less likely to 
influence the use of costly health care over which these enrolees have less control (Monheit 
2003; Stanton and Rutherford 2006). 
MSAs are also unlikely to have a significant effect on health-care costs where they are 
voluntary, because low-income individuals and families, who account for a disproportionate 
share of health spending, have been shown to be less likely to enrol and/or contribute to their 
accounts (Parente, Feldman, and Christianson 2004a, 2004b; Minicozzi 2006; Chen, Lo 
Sasso, and Nandam 2013; Helmchen et al. 2015). Several studies have suggested that MSAs 
and CDHPs tend to attract healthier, lower-risk, younger, higher-income, and/or better-
educated patients (Fowles et al. 2004; Lo Sasso et al. 2004; Tollen, Ross, and Poor 2004; 
Greene et al. 2006; Lo Sasso, Shah, and Frogner 2010; Charlton et al. 2011), although not all 
analyses show that MSA enrolees are, on average, younger or healthier than non-MSA 
enrolees (Parente, Feldman, and Christianson 2004b; Minicozzi 2006). The demographics 
and health status of MSA enrolees are likely to depend in part on plan design and the 
incentives offered to enrolees by individual MSA providers. 
Proponents of MSAs claim that they enhance consumer choice and encourage price 
competition if rational and informed consumers actively search for the cheapest care, 
assuming constant quality (i.e. active purchasing). In one study, enrolees in low-deductible 
CDHPs reported being more likely than enrolees in other plans to start using health-care 
information when seeking care, such as looking at drug costs from the previous year and 
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comparing quality information from different hospitals (Dixon, Greene, and Hibbard 2008). 
However, an interview-based study showed that only around half of the 458 adult 
interviewees — all of whom had recently enrolled in a CDHP with a deductible — were 
aware they had a deductible, while less than 7% knew which medical services were subject to 
or exempt from the deductible (Reed et al. 2009). Low awareness of such information is 
likely to impede MSA enrolees from engaging in active purchasing. One analysis also 
suggested that a large proportion of primary-care clinicians were not prepared, at the time of 
the study, to provide information to patients enrolled in HSAs about the costs of various 
medical services, including radiologic tests (54% of sampled clinicians reported being 
“ready” or “very ready”; 95% CI: 50-59%), specialist visits (38%; 95% CI: 33-42%), and 
hospitalisations (33%; 95% CI: 29-37%) (Mallya, Pollack, and Polsky 2008); more than two-
thirds of the 528 respondents, however, felt ready to give advice to patients about the costs of 
laboratory tests, office visits, and medications. 
Several articles have highlighted how difficult it is for patients to obtain price and quality 
information about health-care services in the USA (Reinhardt 2006; Muhlestein, Wilks, and 
Richter 2013), while interviews with health policy experts in South Africa found little price 
competition after the introduction of MSAs (Jost 2005). In South Africa, MSAs have instead 
shifted the focus of private insurers away from the active purchasing of more efficient, better-
quality health care and towards risk selection and shifting costs onto policy holders to keep 
premiums low (McLeod and McIntyre 2008). In China, where a large proportion of health 
care is financed through out-of-pocket payments, it is common for doctors to ask patients 
during consultations whether they have funds available in their MSAs. This may lead some 
doctors to over-prescribe medicines and diagnostic tests to those with large surpluses in their 
accounts (Xue and Zhao 2007; Sheng and Hou 2011). Overall, more research is needed to 
determine whether it is feasible for institutions to collect and disseminate easy-to-understand 
price and quality data to patients in countries where MSAs are available. It would also be 
important to see whether patients could use such information effectively when purchasing 
health care. 
 
Equity and financial protection 
 
MSAs allow enrolees to spread the financial risk of ill health over time. They do not, 
however, ensure that people will have enough savings to pay for large, unexpected health-
care bills, nor do they foster social solidarity (Jost 2007). In 2011, Medisave withdrawals and 
Medishield claims only accounted for about 5.5% and 2.1% of national health expenditure in 
Singapore, respectively (Singapore Ministry of Health 2013), with most health care paid for 
out-of-pocket. One study suggested that HSA enrolees in the USA who paid for their own 
accounts — with no employer contributions — were significantly more likely to report 
financial burdens than enrolees with only employer contributions (17.3% vs. 11.9%, p<0.05) 
(Reed et al. 2012). 
In Singapore and China, the use of earned income to finance MSAs discriminates against 
retired, unemployed, disabled, and chronically ill people (Jost 2007). Meanwhile, a US study 
found that employees with chronic illnesses were more likely than other employees to deplete 
their HSA savings and to spend more on their deductibles (Parente, Christianson, and 
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Feldman 2007). Another analysis observed that enrolment in CDHPs was associated with a 
similar reduction in beneficial care among both vulnerable and non-vulnerable patient groups 
(Haviland et al. 2011). The authors posited that this might impact the health of low-income 
and chronically ill patients more than the health of non-vulnerable groups (Haviland et al. 
2011). 
Yip and Hsiao (2009) modelled the financial protection offered by first-dollar coverage 
plans and MSAs in rural Chinese regions based on household data. They determined that 
first-dollar plans were more likely to limit impoverishment due to medical expenses than 
MSAs coupled with high-deductible catastrophic coverage: the empirical model suggested 
that first-dollar plans would lower the poverty headcount by 6.1-6.8%, whereas joint 
MSAs/catastrophic insurance would lower the headcount by 3.5-3.9%. These calculations 
were based on a poverty line of USD 1.08 per person per day. The authors attributed this 
finding to the fact that MSA funds could not be spent on outpatient care, which was the main 
source of impoverishment for chronically ill people in the study regions. Liu and colleagues 
(2002) showed that the introduction of MSAs as part of employee health insurance in 
Zhenjiang, China, increased the use of outpatient health care among lower socioeconomic 
groups, although Yi and colleagues (2005) concluded that the Zhenjiang pilot model of health 
care financing was regressive. Data from the first year of the Jiujiang and Zhenjiang pilot 
studies suggested the reform shifted the financial burden from the healthy to the sick (Yip 
and Hsiao 1997). Those patients who exhausted the funds in their MSAs had to pay a 
deductible corresponding to 5% of their wages before insurance would begin to cover 
additional costs (Yip and Hsiao 1997). Pei (2008), Liu and Chen (2013), and Xia (2014) have 
all found that, because of the lack of risk pooling across individuals, Chinese patients with 
substantial health needs tend to deplete their MSAs, while young and healthy patients tend to 
keep large, unused surpluses in their accounts. 
Tax exemptions and subsidies for MSAs in the USA and Singapore often benefit wealthier 
people disproportionately, especially when provided at the marginal rate of taxation so that 
individuals in higher tax brackets receive greater tax relief. Even if tax exemptions were 
provided at a standard rate, they would not benefit those who do not pay taxes, including 
unemployed people, non-working dependants, and individuals with earnings below the tax 
threshold (Glied and Remler 2005; Hoffman and Tolbert 2006; Minicozzi 2006).  
Furthermore, HSAs attract a triple tax benefit in the USA: the contributions are tax-
deductible, the earned interest is tax-free, and the withdrawals to pay for approved medical 
costs are tax-free. HSAs are marketed as effective savings vehicles to help people pay for 
health-care costs at older ages, as long as the savings are not used until retirement (Fronstin 
2014); after age 65, HSA funds can be used to pay for non-medical expenses, without 
penalty, although ordinary taxes still apply. Such savings, however, would be more likely to 
benefit those individuals who are wealthy or healthy enough not to need the savings to cover 
out-of-pocket costs, including insurance premiums, before retirement. For example, one study 
estimated that a 55-year old couple setting up an HSA in 2008 would need to accumulate 
between USD 511,000 and USD 1 million by the age of 65 to have a 90% chance of having 
enough savings to cover these expenses in retirement, assuming premiums and other out-of-
pocket costs do not rise faster than adjustments for inflation (Fronstin 2014). 
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Discussion 
 
Country experiences with MSAs indicate the schemes have generally been inefficient and 
inequitable and have not provided adequate financial protection. The impact of the schemes 
on long-term health-care costs is unclear. The lack of interpersonal risk pooling in MSAs is a 
key limitation. 
In China, the mismatch between MSA funds and need for health care led to a total MSA 
surplus of RMB 323 billion in 2014 (USD 50.5 billion based on the average exchange rate for 
that year), which was equal to the combined value of all social health insurance premiums 
(Xinhua News 2015). Some Chinese cities are experimenting with ways of making better use 
of MSA funds. In 2009, Zhenjiang City separated MSAs into two accounts. The main 
account can be used to pay for most types of care, including outpatient, inpatient, preventive, 
and long-term care; previously, it could only be used for outpatient care. All funds above 
RMB 3000 (USD 469) are saved in the secondary account, which can also be used to pay for 
the health care of family members (Xinhua News 2009). Since 2009, the Zhenjiang model 
has been adopted by a growing number of cities in China. In Chengdu City, for example, 
MSA participants can now use funds to pay for private health insurance premiums (Sichuan 
News 2015). Other cities, including Dalian, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Zhongshan, are piloting 
similar initiatives (Xinhua News 2015). 
Yet, MSAs continue to be suggested as appropriate financing options in other countries, 
often by policymakers in finance ministries (Thomson et al. 2010). This may be because 
savings are so commonly used to finance pensions, and people seem to extrapolate from 
pensions to health. However, unlike the more predictable need for income replacement during 
retirement, ill health is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, which means that 
individual savings alone cannot provide adequate financial protection for everyone faced with 
health–care expenses. It is also possible that the lobbying activities of stakeholders help bring 
MSAs to the forefront of political discussions. Banks and other companies offering financial 
services may have strong motives to encourage MSAs given the fees involved, while other 
individuals and groups may be ideologically driven to endorse individual accounts instead of 
options with mandatory risk pooling across individuals. 
Some of the weaknesses of MSAs could be addressed by coupling MSAs with supply-side 
measures, like rewarding low-cost providers to correct price competition failures. If MSAs 
are to be adopted, it will also be important to foster an economic and regulatory environment 
that is conducive to market-oriented plans. Prerequisites for the viability and sustainability of 
MSAs include a high income per capita, a national culture of saving and personal 
responsibility for health, and a well-functioning and transparent regulatory environment, both 
in the health sector and in the financial services sector (Nichols, Prescott, and Phua 1997; 
Chia 2005). 
Finally, this review has shown how MSAs are often coupled with high-deductible plans, 
both of which can take a variety of forms. It is not possible, with the evidence available, to 
draw firm conclusions about whether MSAs can ameliorate the problems associated with 
high-deductible plans. This is an area where more research is needed, although findings may 
be difficult to interpret given differences in context, such as the presence of other safety nets, 
as in Singapore. It is likely, however, that systems with greater complexity, where patients 
 10 
 
draw on multiple plans, will leave more people to fall through the net. This is supported by 
findings cited earlier that indicate a social gradient in MSA take up and that show how few 
people fully understand the deductibles associated with plans in which they are already 
enrolled. 
Despite the recent fervour over MSAs, the case that so-called consumer-directed solutions 
achieve their objectives remains unproven. 
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